The distrust of mainstream media expressed in the slogan 'the liar press' ('Lügenpresse') is often used as an example of a populist, anti-establishment attitude that is currently winning terrain throughout the Western world. In combination with the rise of alternative media (especially online), it poses a serious challenge for 'old media'. But how do those who are most suspicious and critical relate to the mainstream media in their own media channels? In this article, we have compared the official Facebook pages of the PEGIDA movement in Germany and Austria, in order to describe their use of references to traditional/mainstream and alternative media. The results indicate that references to mainstream and alternative media are distributed almost equally. Furthermore, when there are references to mainstream media, they are generally of an affirmative nature. These findings are relevant for the debate about cyberbalcanization, echo chambers, filter bubbles and the impact of alternative media on public discourse.
Introduction
Suspiciousness against mainstream media as well as the preference for online and social media are both characteristic of many contemporary populist, far-right and anti-system movements (Alvares & Dahlgren, 2016; Holt, 2016a; Mazzoleni, 2014) . A common argument, across the whole spectrum from moderate and conservative critics of 'the establishment' to far-right activists, is that hegemonic mainstream media conceal or distort information that does not fit a 'politically correct' agenda. This dictum is often vociferously argued and seems to gain traction throughout Western democracies: In Sweden, the notion of a narrow 'corridor of opinion' (Oscarsson, 2010) in public discourse is widely recognized as an accurate description of public discourse and currently a heated debate is raging among journalists and commenters related to just how narrow it is and more specifically how this has affected debate about the immigration crisis (Hellström & Lodenius, 2016; Truedson, 2016) . In the USA, Donald Trump made it an important part of his election campaign to depict biased media as complicitous in 'influencing the election' by systematically favouring Clinton (Trump, 17 October 2016) . We see the same tendencies in Europe (Aalberg, Esser, Reinemann, Strömbäck, & De Vreese, 2016) . In Germany, Frauke Petry, one of the leaders of the right-wing populist party Alternative for Germany (AfD), calls the established media 'pinocchio press' (Binder, 2015) . In Austria, politicians of the Freedom Party (FPÖ) have complained multiple times against the public service station ORF. Although we perceive massive mistrust in traditional media by politicians inside and outside Europe, the connection between these movements and the established media is more complex since every political movement is dependent on publicity (Mazzoleni, 2008) .
The US election in 2016 highlighted the relationship between distrust in mainstream media on the one hand and the rise of alternative media (such as Breitbart.com) on the other. In the last years, a plethora of alternative news and opinion media have emerged, especially online, some of which have managed to attract readers and also make an impact on public discourse (Holt, 2016a; Storz, 2015) . In Europe, these are especially related to populist anti-system, anti-immigration and anti-elite sentiments, many of whom directly address and seek to combat what they perceive as corrupt media institutions. An interview study from Sweden with people involved in running immigration critical alternative media reveals that the ideological focus is not necessarily far-right or extremist, but instead rather diverse, ranging from critical social democrats all the way to an outspoken fascist (Holt, 2016a) . What they all have in common is that they are critical of generous immigration politics and of the way that the question of immigration has been treated in mainstream media. Alternative media with these characteristics therefore need to be understood in the light of their position as self-appointed correctives of traditional media. As such, the PEGIDA movement provides a relevant case for analysis. The social movement was and still is popular in the German-speaking countries, particularly in its country of origin Germany and in Austria where it was topic of media coverage.
In this article, we analyse the PEGIDA Facebook pages in Germany and Austria and show a paradoxical relationship between the movement and established media. Since there has yet been little research done on the content of PEGIDA's Facebook channels, a first step in our analysis is to characterize the content through a close reading of the Facebook pages of the four countries. Our first research question (RQ1) is therefore descriptive and contextualizing: What commonalities and differences become visible when comparing the PEGIDA Facebook pages of the two countries? Here we focus on differences related to tone and function. In a second step, we move toward the main question of the article and ask (RQ2a): To what extent do the PEGIDA pages refer to mainstream media in the official posts on their Facebook pages? and (RQ2b) To what extent do they refer to alternative media? Our final research question (RQ3) aims at the quality of the references found: To what extent are the references to mainstream and alternative media contesting, affirmative or neutral?
PEGIDA and the media
In the end of 2014, a protest movement called 'Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident' (German abbreviation: PEGIDA) emerged as a populist 'street movement' (Dostal, 2015, p. 1) protesting against the political establishment and increased Islamic influence on European culture. It arose from a Facebook group which criticized a pro-Kurdish demonstration in the city of Dresden. On 20 October 2014, a first PEGIDA demonstration took place with approximately 350 protesters (Geiges, Marg, & Walter, 2015) . From that moment on, the group was gathering for 'Monday demonstrations' 1 in the city of Dresden. At its peak in autumn 2015, the movement mobilized nearly 20,000 protesters. Due to the high number of participants in their Monday rallies, not only in Dresden where it originated, the movement caused a public conflict about Islamization as well as about the question if PEGIDA is a racist organization. The Monday demonstrations soon became more and more radical and infamous in Germany and were widely reported in other countries.
2 Additionally, PEGIDA groups were formed in other European countries such as Sweden, Norway, Great Britain or Austria. Although these groups did not transform into mass movements like in Germany, the Austrian Facebook page was quite active in terms of postings and user reactions.
Taking Mudde (2004) into account, PEGIDA can be classified as a populist political movement. The movement refers to the common people in terms of 'heartland' and builds up an antagonism between them and 'the elite' which is seen as corrupt, power-obsessed and harmful to the nation. In populist discourse, the elite group is not limited to established politicians. Also, economic and cultural elites, such as intellectuals, and journalists are seen as a part of a power structure acting against the 'collective will'. Thus, we could assume that populist players reject mainstream media coverage as it is seen as propaganda by the state. PEGIDA is also an example for 'thick populism' (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007) : It is not only against elite groups but also excludes certain social groups from the 'heartland', particularly Muslims.
Although PEGIDA was a major issue at that time in German media coverage, there was only one official media appearance of a PEGIDA spokesperson in the TV talk show Günther Jauch on 18 January 2015. Since its founding, PEGIDA officially refused to talk to journalists as the movement denounced all established media as being part of the 'liar press' ('Lügenpresse'). Branches of PEGIDA in other countries follow the same pattern and communicate with members and the public mainly through their official Facebook pages. This means that PEGIDA leaders do not focus on mass media communication, for example by using press statements or organizing press conferences, but channel their communication with supporters and the general public exclusively through social media. This illustrates the situation that Chadwick (2013) has called 'the hybrid media system', in which traditional ways of creating and disseminating political news can be bypassed through alternative channels successfully and yet gain coverage in traditional media.
Alternative media and protest
The use of social media platforms by protest movements was particularly investigated during protests which achieved international attention, for example, the Arab Spring (Wolover, 2016) , the Gezi Protests in Turkey (Haciyakupoglu & Zhang, 2015) or the Stuttgart 21 protests in Germany (Jungherr & Jürgens, 2013 . Other studies point out that controversial movements (such as populist parties or organizations) tend to rely more on alternative media than mainstream media (e.g., Larsson, 2015) . The term 'alternative media' is usually connotated with left-wing activism and came up in the 1970s when new social movements were established. These mainly left-wing movements founded own media outlets to counter mainstream media companies which were seen as a part of the establishment. A common definition of 'alternative media' is still missing as alternative media can not only be defined as an alternative in terms of content but also concerning production process, professional ethos and distribution (Holtz-Bacha, 2015) . Today new forms of online communication fostered the emergence of alternative media projects.
Most researchers agree that social media is relevant in modern social movements but effects vary because of different contexts in political culture, freedom of access and use of the internet, the media system or the topic of the protests. In addition to these external factors, we see methodological problems like different approaches to empirical research (Boulianne, 2016, p. 534) . In the case of PEGIDA Germany, the use of social media is crucial since the movement refuses to talk to mainstream media and organizes its protests mainly via Facebook.
Although more and more populist and right-wing media formats are established on the internet, there is less research on it. Most research on alternative media focuses on a positive effect for democratic discourse, particularly the outcomes of participatory journalism or citizen journalism (Atton, 2006) . In that kind of understanding, media criticism is seen as a fundamental cause for the (normatively desirable) establishment of alternative journalism in contradiction to bourgeois media companies (Raabe, 2013) . The research focus clearly lies on the analysis of left-wing alternative media which ignores media projects on the right side of the political spectrum. Studies on right-wing alternative media tend to focus on the most extreme cases, like the forum Stormfront (Meddaugh & Kay, 2009 ), the British National Party's website (Atton, 2006) . Atkinson and Leon Berg (2012) is an exception, analysing what they call 'right-leaning alternative media', and their relation to Tea Party activism. Their conclusions point to the importance of alternative media for the 'narrowmobilization' of protest actions such as 'marches and town hall disruptions' (p. 531). They suggest that right-leaning alternative media might be more important concerning mobilization than left-leaning alternative media, because the messages tend to be much clearer in terms of pointing out enemies and faults, while left-leaning alternative media tend to use vaguer and more inclusive discursive strategies.
Rauch (2015) is one of the few who has studied alternative media from a user-perspective, asking American readers of left-leaning as well as right-leaning alternative media what they count as alternative media and why they use them. Her results suggest that her respondents 'resisted mainstream media to some extent, using alternative media as a complement instead of a replacement' (p. 138) a statement that held for both groups. The most important attributes of alternative media, according to Rauch's respondents, were that they should be devoted to issues and events not discussed elsewhere and to allow a wide range of people to express their voices and opinions. Their main criticism of mainstream media had to do with a sense of them being compromised by corporations and biased by the politics of their owners.
'Little attention has been paid to right-wing media as alternative media' as Atton (2006, p. 574) summarizes the literature on alternative media. This fact does not only show a research gap in political and journalism studies. The growing influence of right-wing alternative online services in terms of user numbers and the spread of postings by sharing can be seen as one example of an ongoing polarization and fragmentation of the political discourse in liberal democracies (Müller, 2008; Storz, 2015) .
Media distrust, echo chambers and counter-publics
For specific groups, the sense of being depicted in an unfavourable way by the media can have an impact on their inclination to participate democratically and to respect and follow democratic decisions (Tsfati & Cohen, 2005) . Furthermore, when certain groups cease to trust the way reality is being portrayed in media texts for suspicions of bias, a fundamental aspect of the media and their role in democracies is called into question. As Tsfati and Cohen (2005) point out, mistrust and scepticism of the media is a subjective perception and different groups often perceive the same news as biased against them (Ariyanto, Hornsey, & Gallois, 2007; Hartmann & Tanis, 2013; Perloff, 2015) . Tsfati (2003) defines media scepticism as a sense of 'alienation and mistrust toward the mainstream media' which involves the 'feeling that journalists are not fair or objective in their reports about society and that they do not always tell the whole story' (p. 67) and that mainstream journalists 'will sacrifice accuracy and precision for personal and commercial gains' (p. 67). Media criticism by populists addresses three accusations: First, that mainstream media refuses to cover issues which are not 'suitable' for the establishment. Second, established media is accused of hiding important information in its coverage, such as the origin of perpetrators. Third, criticism implies that journalists intentionally lie to the public -a claim which crystallizes in the 'liar press' shouts of PEGIDA. Media criticism of a sceptic brand is therefore quite different from other types of criticism, where the focus is primarily on criticizing for the sake of 'improving' the quality of various aspects of media work or products (Von Krogh & Nord, 2010) . However, if certain groups in society choose to abstain from participation in the mainstream platforms of public discourse (the 'agora') and instead entrench themselves in 'counter-public spheres' (Engesser & Wimmer, 2009; Fenton, 2008; Leung & Lee, 2014) where discourses of alienation and mistrust in conventional democratic channels are disseminated and amplified, it can be deeply problematic from a democratic perspective (Sunstein, 2007) . First, it reveals that some people feel that they cannot participate on equal terms. Second, it becomes an obstacle for civilized deliberation between conflicting parts (Bossetta, 2012; Fenton, 2008) . The development and expansion of the internet is fertile soil for counter-public spheres as more and more organizations and individuals communicate without classical intermediaries. The underlying assumption is that the common public sphere for the discussion of political topics fragments increasingly. Storz (2015) found out that distributors of alternative right-wing online and offline media in Germany seek to build up an autonomous media public. In a worst-case scenario, users solely retrieve their political information in closed 'echo chambers' (Jamieson & Cappella, 2008 ) -an effect which can be reinforced by algorithms on social media sites leading to 'filter bubbles' (Pariser, 2011) . On the other hand, a Swedish analysis of the most influential alternative immigration critical news outlets revealed that they referred to traditional, mainstream media in over 60% of the coded articles, suggesting a relationship of dependence and secondary status, rather than an autonomous media public (Holt, 2016b) .
Sites such as Swedish Samnytt.se, Friatider.se, the German Pi-news.net, Metropolico.org (former Blu-NEWS), the Austrian FPÖ-TV and Unzensuriert.at have become increasingly bold in their discourse and also manage to have an impact on public debate -mainly because of repeated bursts of outrage and indignation from mainstream media players over some of the alternative media and their positions (Gourarie, 2016) .
In this article, we look into how the PEGIDA movement relates to both mainstream media and alternative media in their official communication to the public through their Facebook posts in Germany and Austria. Both countries were (to various degrees) affected dramatically by the 2015 migration crisis and are similar in the sense that they received many immigrants compared to other European countries, have generous conditions for refugees, supported in general by the political parties in power and influential debaters in public discourse. Therefore, PEGIDA is an example of a movement that clearly defines itself as being marginalized and in stark opposition to a perceived mainstream/elite perspective (like in typical theoretical conceptions of alternative media, e.g., Bailey, Cammaerts, & Carpentier, 2008) in both countries in ways that would not be as clear in other many European countries. Germany is the most obvious case in this respect, whereas in Austria there have been more immigration critical voices visible even in the mainstream political scene for a longer period (Berry, Garcia-Blanco, & Moore, 2016) . This has particularly to do with different scandal cultures: The expression of criticism in the field of migration is often connoted with right-wing politics and leads to a social exclusion -a fact which Hondrich (1992, p. 184) calls 'conflicts on collective identity'. Although German and Austrian societies can be seen as similar in many aspects (language, political system), Austrian politicians managed to draw the line between neo-Nazism and right-wing positions.
However, the emergence of PEGIDA is related to the advent of a new type of strongly articulated populist immigration criticism. The rise of PEGIDA as well media distrust by right-wing politicians and movements was a dominating topic in public and media discourse. Since the countries nevertheless differ in these respects, a comparison between Germany and Austria is relevant, as there might be differences in the way that PEGIDA express themselves and relate to other media in the other countries than the 'homeland' of the movement. The German and Austrian pages have substantial following and more dynamic content flows in terms of interaction with users. The Austrian page had approximately 20,000 likes in November 2016, the (first) German page even had about 150,000 likes in February 2015 -more than the Facebook page of the Christian Democratic Union had. Thus, both pages have a wide range and could consequently have a strong impact on public discourse.
Methodology
In order to answer RQ1, we performed a qualitative content analysis of the two countries' PEGIDA pages. The aim was to provide a description of the general tone of language on the different pages and what stands out as the main purpose of the Facebook page. Purpose refers to if the Facebook page is used more for internal organizational purposes or for spreading their message outwardly. By looking into the tone, we analyse if the countries differed regarding the level of hostility towards outgroups and to take a closer look at the different types of references to other media. In the quantitative main part of the study, we measured the occurrence of references and their function. But the variables do not capture what kind of alternative media a posting refers to -are they merely immigration critical or do they represent extremist organizations? Such distinctions are important for getting a better understanding of the type of references found. Therefore, we analysed all of the downloaded postings in order to describe the general tone of the postings in each country. We also followed up on links to alternative media.
We downloaded all official Facebook posts of PEGIDA Germany and Austria between 1 June and 30 September to screen one of the most intense phases of the asylum crisis in central and northern Europe during summer 2015. Official postings are all postings appearing on the Facebook page of the movements on the top level of the page that means messages which are placed on the timeline as main postings. Since users cannot place initial postings on the pages and because of the communicative strategy of PEGIDA to avoid mainstream media communication, we assume that the collected page postings can be seen as genuine messages of the movement. Overall, the dataset includes 735 units of analysis. User comments were not analysed as they do not contribute to the research questions.
The coding scheme for the quantitative part of the study builds on (Holt, 2016b) who distinguishes between references to mainstream media and alternative media and references of different types. In a first step, we coded whether the posting contained a reference to mainstream or alternative media platforms, e.g., citations or mere mentions of them, and hyperlinks to them. If at least one type of reference was used in a single posting, it was coded in the respective category. In a further step, it was coded which function the reference to mainstream or alternative media had.
The first category of references could be described as 'I told you so!' -references to traditional as well as alternative media. This kind of reference is in essence used to prove own political positions. On 3 September, for example, the German PEGIDA page cited the Federal Minister of the Interior, Thomas de Maizière, in an online article of the Süddeutsche Zeitung in which he suggests that the integration of Arab refugees could cause problems. Such references were coded as affirmative references since it is clear from the context that the reference is used in support of views found throughout the PEGIDA page.
The second category of references corresponds to the 'lying press' dictum (contesting references cf. Holt, 2016b) . This is when a post includes a reference to other media and the purpose of the post is to criticize it in some way. Typically, such posts contain a reference to a story in a news report from some mainstream outlet, criticizing it for omitting certain facts for example.
The third kind of use of media references is when neither the first or second could be said to apply -these are considered neutral references. Consequently, it serves as a residual category.
We tested these variables on a German sample in a pre-study (Holt & Haller, 2016) and found that these types of references to other media could be applied successfully. Before coding the whole material, we also performed a pre-study in order to determine if these variables were applicable. After going through the first 20 postings in each country, we deemed them applicable to the content in both countries.
Since one of the authors was the sole coder who conducted the content analysis, we firstly performed an intracoder reliability test where we re-coded 15% of the whole material in each language after more than six months. This yielded a satisfactory average Krippendorff's alpha score of 0.87 for the sample and (the scores were: 1.0 for 'reference to mainstream media', 0.8812 for 'reference to alternative media', 0.6071 for 'mainstream media use' and 1.0 for alternative media use). The variable 'mainstream media use' returned a lower score, and we decided to recruit an additional coder in order to test intercoder reliability for that variable. The coder was first trained according to our codebook and then coded 15% of the material. The results were satisfactory: 0.72 (Krippendorff's alpha) (n = 53).
Findings
In answer to our first research question, we could see that a clearer focus on dissemination of political messages was visible -for example in the shape of memes with anti-Islam messages or political criticism. Following Jungherr and Jürgens (2013) , social movements use two main types of postings: The posting of political messages can be seen as an act of strategical symbolic communication by PEGIDA. In addition to that, the movement posted information on upcoming demonstrations such as advertising or routes which can be defined as tactical communication. The analysis showed that both pages published these two types of postings. However, the German PEGIDA site released more organizational postings which is not surprising: PEGIDA Germany was successful in carrying out demonstrations in several cities. On the contrary, the Austrian branch mostly remained a virtual movement although there were activities in real life.
In practice, political postings mainly thematized terror attacks and migration, particularly Muslims in Germany and Austria. A second political topic was criticism of established politicians and media which was often framed with populist antagonism between 'the people', the elites and social outgroups (Muslims, migrants). A video showing how immigrants use violence against border police at the Hungarian border illustrates messages explicitly focusing on violence. The content of an insulting nature were directed towards Muslims as a group. One example is a meme showing a dog urinating on a praying Muslim with the text 'Good dog!'. In June 2015, the mayoral election in Dresden was a local topic of the German page because the movement had an own candidate. Also, international politics were mentioned on the German page: PEGIDA posted a support message for the right-wing Danish People's Party in the national election. Also in Austria, many messages contained negative statements towards politicians, for example on 2 June when PEGIDA Austria declared the social democrat Franz Voves as 'winner in the contest of broken electoral promises'. In addition to that, the pages posted about Islamist terror attacks to accentuate political standpoints. On 26 June, both pages thematized the attack on a French gas factory.
The content in both countries contained a more varied diet of debate articles, links to stories in the mainstream as well as alternative media. Organizational postings contained calls to action and information on upcoming demonstrations and the movement itself. German PEGIDA often posted about next events in Dresden and other German cities, for example on 14 July with a posting on a rally in Chemnitz: 'On Monday, 20 July 2015, patriots will assemble in Chemnitz.
[…] Go to Chemnitz, friends! Together we are strong!'. Other organizational postings appealed to the voters in Dresden to vote for Tatjana Festerling for mayor. In contrast to the Austrian movement, PEGIDA Germany also published its official political programme consisting of '10 theses' which can be seen as an act to consolidate the movement. The Austrian page contained fewer calls to demonstrations, for instance on 2 September when the site promoted a demonstration in Graz. Analogous to PEGIDA Germany, the Austrian page posted about other political topics like the upcoming EU referendum in Austria: 'Don't forget it, guys! The trip starts next week. Let's leave the undemocratic EU!'.
In summary, we see clear differences but also crucial similarities between the two sites. The Austrian page contained fewer appeals to demonstrations than the German page. Austrian PEGIDA focused more on political postings with hard criticism of politicians and used more insulting language and images than the German branch. On the opposite, PEGIDA Germany used Facebook to keep its rallies alive with calls to demonstrations and information on events. Contrary to the Austrian case, German activists used less insulting messages which might have to do with social pressure and German laws. Overall, the German page had a broader range in terms of likes and Facebook reactions. Nevertheless, we see striking similarities of both pages: PEGIDA Austria and Germany have one major topic, namely migration and Muslims. A second relevant goal is to criticize the political and media establishment. Both sites additionally tried to produce a community feeling by using integrating language such as 'friends', 'together we're strong', 'our way' and by implementing the frame of 'the people' against 'the establishment'.
How PEGIDA relates to other media
We first analysed the numbers of references to other media and how they are distributed between mainstream and alternative media. Table 1 contains the results for both countries and shows an almost exact balance between references to mainstream media and alternative media in both countries. Forty-four percent of all the coded German posts contained references to mainstream media and the same number for the Austrian sample is 39%. In the German sample, 37% of the postings contained references to alternative media. For Austria, the amount was 39%. Also, the number of postings with references to either type of media that also contain a link is similarly distributed over both countries and over both types of media. In the German sample, 35% of the postings containing references to MSM also contained links to content in MSM and in Austria the same percentage is 39%. When it comes to alternative media, the number of postings with links was 36% in the German sample and 35% in the Austrian sample.
Based on the different types of media references described above our quantitative content analysis measured if the cited media was used in an affirmative, contesting or neutral way. Against the background of PEGIDA's outspoken distrust in mainstream media, it is surprising to note that contrary to the expectation that PEGIDA referred mainly negatively to traditional news media, because of the 'liar press' postulate, 66% of all references to mainstream media were 'affirmative' (Table 2) . Less than 25% of the posts in both countries containing references to mainstream media were coded as 'contesting'. Almost none of the references to mainstream media were neutral -with the exception of the Austrian page, where 16% of the references were neutral. In most of these neutral cases, the Austrian PEGIDA page just linked to media content without commenting. 3 When it comes to the use of references to alternative media, the picture is a bit different: the affirmative references (99%) dominate and hardly any contesting or neutral references could be found. This is true for both countries and is not surprising as most of these references relate to anti-system, anti-immigration or rightwing alternative media sites (Holt & Haller, 2017) .
Concluding remarks
Our first research question (RQ1) addressed the commonalities and differences between the Facebook pages of PEGIDA in the two countries. Our second research question (RQ2a) asked to what extent the PEGIDA pages related to mainstream media in the different countries. The results show that more than 40% of all the postings contained references to mainstream media. It is difficult to evaluate the value of this figure because we do not have anything to compare it to. What it does say though, is that PEGIDA's pages are far from cut off from other media. In neither of the countries, they represent a solely insulated space. Instead, the PEGIDA Facebook pages must be seen as a part of a contemporary hybrid media ecology, where news from the traditional channels are spread through various other channels and framed in new settings. Of course, the references to mainstream media found on the PEGIDA pages represent a selection of news and perspectives deemed relevant by those who posted it. But it is clear that despite the 'lügenpresse' dictum, the PEGIDA groups in both countries are in a constant process of relating to the media that they distrust. This indicates that they largely also depend on 'old media' in order to have something to write about. This should be seen in relation to our findings regarding references to alternative media (RQ2b). Since the distribution of references is almost a perfect balance -around the same percentage (40%) of the postings in total referred to mainstream media and alternative media alike. If we see the PEGIDA Facebook pages as examples of 'echo chambers' (Jamieson & Cappella, 2008) , it is clear that what is echoed comes from both alternative and mainstream media -and to the same degree. Related to this is the question if the references are accompanied by links. Here we could not see a clear tendency to be more prone to include links when referring to alternative media than when it comes to alternative media, instead, the numbers were quite equal.
The third and final question (RQ3) was posed in order to distinguish between different types of references to other media. Our findings show that a paradoxical and ambivalent relationship exists between PEGIDA and mainstream media they often criticize. PEGIDA uses traditional media coverage in many Facebook postings, in an affirmative way, to 'prove' own political positions or, as in the case of the neutral references, simply as reference material. In all countries, the online behaviour of the PEGIDA groups therefore seems diametrically opposed to offline claims against established journalism. These findings nuance the assumption that populist players react exclusively negatively to established media coverage and draw a picture of a more complex relationship between alternative media and mainstream media than simply antagonism and exclusivity (cf. Chadwick, 2013) . It is apparent that PEGIDA, in both countries, criticizes the 'liar press' as well as it is using it to support own political beliefs. For instance, PEGIDA posted an article in the newspaper Der Westen with a preview to a TV show of the channel RTL with a live coverage out of a refugee camp. PEGIDA indicated: 'Will the shelter be exclusively prepared for the media?'. Far more paradoxical is the following entry: The movement complained about censorship concerning migration politics and linked to an article in the newspaper Handelsblatt about problems during the refugee crisis.
This ambivalent and paradoxical relationship to traditional media can be placed within a broader discussion about how populist players exist in relation to the very media they describe as main antagonists. On the one hand, PEGIDA often refers to the term 'Lügen-presse' to discredit the work of journalists. On the other hand, the movement not only uses media content as a reference but also needs media coverage to reach a bigger public such as the demonstrations in their 'capital' Dresden. The relationship of opposition against mainstream media is thus also, it seems, a relationship of dependence. Of the postings containing references to mainstream media, it was not primarily the 'contesting' form of references that dominated, but the 'affirmative' ones. This suggests that, in addition to criticizing the 'mainstream', they simply use the material published there for their own use, much like the general tendency visible in journalism on the web, where more and more material is rewrites of stories and news produced by others (Karlsson & Holt, 2016) . The PEGIDA pages as echo chambers are therefore very much a part of a more general media ecology, where the agenda originates to a large extent from established journalistic media in the mainstream, and where specific Facebook groups or other alternative communication channels react to stories, topics and views expressed by others rather than exclusively setting their own agenda. In relation to concerns about balkanization (Sunstein, 2007) , echo chambers (Jamieson & Cappella, 2008) and filter bubbles (Pariser, 2011) , this is an interesting observation. Although these media represent good illustrations of cyberbalkanization (Sunstein, 2007) , online spaces where like-minded people avoid contact with those who disagree, it is clear that they are not insular, closed off spaces. It lies beyond the scope of this article to draw definitive conclusions, but this suggests that the hybridity (Chadwick, 2013) of communication flows in these spheres, bubbles and chambers should be more emphasized in the discussion about their effects on public discourse, especially when taking Rauch's (2015) findings about the mixed consumption of news into account.
Limitations
Some limitations of this study have to be emphasized: We focused on the relationship between PEGIDA pages and mainstream and alternative media in two European countries. The content analysis was conducted in a three-month period in 2015 and may therefore not be representative for all postings on the page. Moreover, the case of the German page is special. As mentioned above, the official page which was part of the empirical analysis was deleted by Facebook. However, a new Facebook page was launched by the movement which seems to be more aggressive. It could be that the page operator now refers to alternative right-wing sites with a higher degree as a side effect of the radicalization of the movement and because of a higher establishment of alternative sites in Germany in 2016.
Further research
Overall, research on populist online communication contributes to the current discourse on a growing populism in liberal democratic societies. The election of Donald Trump in the USA, government responsibility of populist players like Viktor Orbán in Hungary or the ongoing success of populist parties such as the Alternative for Germany (AfD), the Front National in France, the Austrian Freedom Party or UKIP in United Kingdom could be seen as indications of a 'Populist Zeitgeist' which Mudde (2004) predicted. In such times, it is especially important to consider many aspects of a phenomenon, because things are not always what they seem at first hand. Our study serves an exploratory purpose and has aimed at pointing to the paradoxical nature of the populist movement PEGIDA and its relationship with media. Our results open up for new questions to be asked.
The results clearly show that the relationship between right-wing alternative media and traditional mainstream media is a rather complex one. Further research should therefore focus on the motivations of anti-system and/or right-wing media producers. Qualitative interviews with players in that political field could show us the reason why traditional media content is used strategically: Are such counter-publics not that established in terms of information supply as recent studies (Storz, 2015) indicate? Or are links to mainstream media seen as a more reputable source of information to be attractive to less radicalized recipients? (Holt, 2016a) shows in an interview study on Swedish alternative media makers that distrust in established media is one driving motivation for their engagement in media production. More research, particularly with qualitative methods, could clarify that paradoxical relationship.
A further point for discussion in relation to the results from our study is how it relates to research about the hostile media effect (Hartmann & Tanis, 2013 , Perloff, 2015 Tsfati & 
